Toronto Consulate Shooting, Synagogue Attacks, and Antisemitic Violence in Canada

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman examine the shooting near the U.S. consulate in Toronto, recent gunfire attacks on synagogues, and the broader rise of antisemitic violence in Canada and beyond. They distinguish organized state direction from ideological inspiration, discuss how extremist networks test social tolerance and law-enforcement capacity, and compare patterns in Canada, Australia, and other democracies. The conversation explores Iranian strategy, diaspora politics, radicalization, institutional complacency, the normalization of bullying and antisemitism, and the symbolic targeting of Jewish institutions. Both argue that vigilance, serious enforcement, and analytical clarity are now essential for democratic security today.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Reports emerged that shots were fired near the U.S. consulate in Toronto during the early phase of the conflict between Israel, the United States, and Iran. That immediately raised concerns about proxies or sleeper cells. Larger states with long histories of intelligence operations often rely on networks abroad—from Syria’s intelligence apparatus to the CIA and MI6. Iran’s main security and intelligence structures include the Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which oversees the Quds Force responsible for external operations. In this incident, police responded early Tuesday morning to reports of gunfire near the U.S. consulate at University Avenue and Queen Street West in downtown Toronto. Security agencies have expressed concern about retaliatory violence linked to tensions in the Middle East. Retaliatory or symbolic attacks during geopolitical crises are not new; what we may be seeing is another wave tied to the current escalation. Around the same period, reports circulated about the disappearance of an Iranian scientist in British Columbia, although details remain unclear and unconfirmed in public reporting. Separately, Canada has seen a rise in antisemitic incidents since the war between Israel and Hamas began in October 2023, with multiple police services documenting increased hate crimes and harassment. Given that environment, what is your assessment of the risk of retaliatory attacks directed at sites like the American consulate in Toronto?

Irina Tsukerman: It is notable that Ontario Premier Doug Ford publicly raised the possibility of sleeper cells. At the same time, some media outlets discussed reports of intercepted communications suggesting Iran might be encouraging sympathizers abroad to act. Other analysts caution that the evidence is ambiguous and that interpreting it as a direct activation signal may be overstated. At best, some argue it could function as a rhetorical signal rather than Popular imagination often jumps to something like The Manchurian Candidate, the Cold a formal operational order.

War thriller about programmed assassins. Reality is usually less theatrical. If an act occurs, it is often carried out by individuals who interpret events as a call to action rather than by formally controlled agents.

There has been little public evidence showing that Iran is formally directing sleeper-cell activity in North America. In many recent conflicts, Iran has relied on regional partners—such as Hezbollah or other aligned groups—rather than covert networks in Western countries. That does not prevent individuals from acting on their own motivations. There was a recent incident in California in which two Jewish men were assaulted after speaking Hebrew, with attackers referencing the conflict in the Middle East. Situations like that show how geopolitical events can inspire violence. But inspiration and organized direction are very different things. Without evidence, it would be speculative to attribute such attacks to the IRGC or any state actor.

Donald Trump once said in an interview with filmmaker Errol Morris that his favorite film was Citizen Kane. He described it as a tragedy about a powerful man who becomes increasingly isolated despite wealth and influence. Trump has also used rhetoric such as “I never forgive,” which reflects a combative, personal style of political language rather than the themes of the film itself.

It really is. Iran often operates along lines that resemble mafia-style power structures. In theory, that should mean the two sides understand each other well, but that mutual understanding can also create strategic dilemmas. When both sides recognize the other’s tactics and thresholds, it becomes harder to call a bluff or force escalation without risk.

The shooting at the consulate was preceded by several shootings targeting synagogues in Toronto. Around the same period, there was also an explosion targeting a synagogue in Liège, Belgium. The timing raises questions about whether some level of coordination exists at the cell level. Synagogues are frequent targets for antisemitic extremists or actors sympathetic to terrorist movements. Sometimes these individuals are described as “lone wolves,” but many exist within loosely connected online extremist communities—people who engage in intense rhetoric and occasionally translate that rhetoric into action.

Canada generally experiences fewer high-profile shootings than the United States, which makes a cluster of incidents like this appear unlikely to be purely coincidental. Canada also has a large Iranian diaspora, and critics have argued that individuals connected to the Iranian regime have sometimes been able to travel or operate in the country with limited scrutiny. That context creates grounds for suspicion that more organized activity could be involved.

Canadian political leaders have condemned attacks on Jewish institutions. If multiple incidents with antisemitic or anti-American elements are occurring within a short timeframe, that would warrant a thorough investigation and potentially cooperation with U.S. authorities in the case of the consulate incident. The United States has extensive investigative resources and intelligence capabilities that could support such an effort.

At the same time, not every violent incident is connected to Iran. There have also been attacks in North America inspired by other extremist ideologies, including ISIS. The broader environment matters. Periods of geopolitical crisis, heated rhetoric, and escalating messaging can create a climate in which individuals feel justified in committing violence. Some may belong to loosely organized communities, while others act independently. The line between coordinated action and ideological inspiration can become difficult to distinguish. If individuals are willing to act in ways that advance the goals of a foreign regime without formal recruitment, that raises questions about how much direct organization is even necessary to destabilize communities.

Jacobsen: Formal recruitment is not always necessary for radicalization. With the internet and social media, individuals can become ideologically radicalized while also becoming socially isolated. We have seen disturbing cases where vulnerable teenagers interacting with online systems or communities are encouraged to distrust family and friends and withdraw from support networks. In some tragic cases connected to lawsuits and investigations, vulnerable individuals have been pushed toward self-harm.

Radicalization can also move outward rather than inward. Some individuals publicly pledge allegiance to extremist groups before committing violence. In Canada, many lone-actor attacks have involved men who subscribe to some form of ideological grievance—sometimes misogynistic belief systems, sometimes other extremist commitments. These patterns show how personal isolation, ideological communities, and global political narratives can converge in dangerous ways.

Men sometimes kill women individually or in larger numbers, as in the École Polytechnique massacre. There are also intermediate forms of radicalization. Identity politics can be weaponized—not that it should be, but it can be. Someone may define themselves through an ethnic, national, or linguistic identity, such as being part of the Persian diaspora, and then come to identify with the IRGC. In that framework, violence against the regime can be interpreted as violence against the individual as part of an extended group outside the country. That can create conditions in which retaliatory violence becomes possible. I am not saying that is what happened in these cases.

To put the pattern on the record, this is just in 2026. On January 2 in Winnipeg, hate-related symbols were spray-painted on the Shaarey Zedek Synagogue. On March 2 in North York, Temple Emanu-El was struck by gunfire. On March 7 in Thornhill, Beth Avraham Yoseph of Toronto was also hit by gunfire. Also on the morning of March 7 in North York, Shaarei Shomayim was hit by multiple shots at its front doors. These appear to be distance gunfire attacks directed at identifiable Jewish buildings and symbols. Given how recently and repeatedly this has happened, there appears to be an identifiable pattern. I do not think it takes much, at least preliminarily, to see that. What do you think?

Tsukerman: It is definitely a pattern. It is possible that whoever is behind these incidents is testing the waters before attempting something at closer range and potentially more lethal. They may also be testing the level of social acceptance such activity will draw: how much outrage it provokes, how seriously authorities investigate it, and how quickly they move to stop it.

They may also be counting on strained institutional capacity. With major public events and security pressures stretching resources, law enforcement attention may already be divided, and that can create perceived openings for further attacks.

Jacobsen: I have many questions about comparative cases. For example, if you take another Anglophone country and begin to see repeated patterns of gunfire attacks, does that later escalate into closer-range violence? We have seen cases of distance rifle fire before. I was thinking of either Australia or New Zealand—the case in which 12 people were killed. We should also note the broader rise in antisemitic rhetoric and sentiment followed by violent acts. I have made that point many times, and I think you agree. It is not an especially sophisticated observation, but it is a natural one.

Tsukerman: I do not know how much official political messaging directly shapes the atmosphere. We cannot hold officials responsible for specific incidents, because they are not telling people to shoot someone or attack a building. But when rhetoric paints Israel in absolute terms, or assigns collective blame, or gives excuses to extremist demagogues and social media personalities, it is fair to ask whether that creates an environment in which this kind of violence feels tolerated or unlikely to be pursued aggressively.

Jacobsen: The first major additional question I have relates to a case involving an individual connected to Pakistan who became radicalized there and later traveled to either New Zealand or Australia. I need to verify the exact country. He murdered around a dozen Jewish people and injured many others. One striking aspect was that the attacker, a radicalized Muslim man, was eventually tackled by another Muslim man.

What I do not know is whether there had been a prior pattern of attacks without fatalities targeting synagogues or other identifiable Jewish institutions in that country before the mass-casualty attack, or whether the attack occurred without that kind of preceding pattern.

Tsukerman: There had been other incidents around the same time. Over the past several years there has been a broader increase in both violent and nonviolent antisemitic incidents. This has been documented by the Australian Jewish community. Organizations such as the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council track and highlight these events.

Regarding the Pakistan-related case, some of the coverage from Australian officials and media has been incomplete. My sources suggest the situation was more complicated. The individuals involved did not simply travel to Pakistan and encounter extremists by chance. The trip was organized after they were already on a path toward radicalization, and local extremist figures facilitated further connections.

Jacobsen: So it was not a casual cultural trip where someone happened to encounter radical figures.

Tsukerman: Exactly. It was not random or accidental. It was structured to deepen involvement in organized extremist networks. Prior to the trip, the individuals had already been influenced locally by Islamist activists who were known to authorities. Some of these figures had been questioned or investigated, but despite evidence of sympathies for groups such as ISIS, enforcement actions were limited.

Another element sometimes raised in discussions is the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, known as the ISI. Certain analysts argue that factions within the ISI have historically cultivated relationships with militant groups, particularly in conflicts involving India and Kashmir. For example, the 2008 Mumbai attacks involved militants linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba operating from Pakistan. Because of that history, some observers interpret certain incidents through the lens of state-connected networks rather than purely spontaneous radicalization.

However, interpretations vary widely, and the available public evidence often remains incomplete. Distinguishing between organized direction, ideological influence, and individual radicalization remains one of the central analytical challenges when examining extremist violence across different countries.

Jacobsen: If you watch the footage of the individual with the rifle, the handling suggests a reasonably skilled shooter. The firing and reloading were not slow. Compared with highly trained military personnel, the performance was not exceptional, but it showed enough competence to suggest prior experience with firearms.

Tsukerman: I agree. He appears to have had at least some level of training, possibly formal training. As I mentioned earlier, I suspect the father already held those views before arriving in Australia. That may explain why he encouraged his son’s connections with local Islamist networks and supported his further radicalization. The son then traveled to Pakistan and the Philippines.

The Philippines is noteworthy because, historically, extremist training camps connected to regional militant networks have operated there. During the 1980s, amid the Soviet–Afghan war and related geopolitical dynamics, various militant groups trained across parts of Southeast Asia. So the idea of extremist networks operating in that region is not new.

Another issue is that some elements of the story appear to have been downplayed by authorities. At different points, officials suggested that the individuals simply remained in a hotel while traveling in the Philippines, which later reporting indicated was inaccurate.

Zooming out, there has been increased involvement by some Pakistan-linked militant networks in conflicts across the Middle East. These networks sometimes intersect with organizations connected to the Muslim Brotherhood or other extremist movements active in Syria and elsewhere. Analysts have observed increased activity linking Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Based on conversations with people familiar with the situation, there is concern that similar incidents could occur again.

Jacobsen: When people talk about a “male loneliness epidemic,” they are not referring to this kind of brotherhood.

Tsukerman: No, not at all. These networks are rarely lonely or isolated in the sociological sense. While some recruits—such as young converts or alienated teenagers—may initially feel disconnected, the broader structures are highly organized and community-based. They often operate through family ties and tight social networks. Members marry within the group and maintain strong internal bonds. The result is a cohesive and exclusive environment rather than isolation.

Jacobsen: In Canada we see a different pattern emerging. Prime Minister Carney has issued statements about recent incidents, although the case that received the most attention domestically was the attack in Tumbler Ridge. I could also return to an interview I conducted with a CSIS expert who served for more than three decades. He noted that the most frequently thwarted terrorist plots in Canada have involved Islamist extremism. Within ideological frameworks that rely on literalist interpretations of religious texts, Jewish communities often become targets. That raises the possibility of connections between some of the attacks that have been prevented and the incidents we are now seeing. Intelligence systems can resemble Swiss cheese: when enough gaps appear, someone eventually slips through.

Tsukerman: My understanding is that Australia has faced challenges in this area as well. Some of the policing responses have been criticized as inadequate. Officers may not have specialized training for dealing with complex extremist networks, and investigators sometimes lack the broader strategic context needed to connect separate incidents.

Jacobsen: Countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have also experienced long periods of domestic security stability. Canada, for example, went roughly eight decades without a serious threat to its territorial sovereignty. Long stretches of peace and prosperity can produce institutional complacency. When societies are accustomed to safety for generations, it becomes easy to underestimate how external conflicts and ideological movements can manifest within domestic borders. The result is a slow recognition that the security environment has changed.

Tsukerman: There is also a political dimension to the response. In Australia, one reaction was to tighten gun control laws. Yet the central issue in that case was that the attacker had already violated existing laws by obtaining more weapons than permitted. The problem was not the absence of regulation but the failure to enforce regulations already in place.

Another policy response involved restrictions on speech. Authorities attempted to prohibit certain slogans, such as “globalize the intifada.” That may limit open propaganda in public spaces, but it will not necessarily prevent extremist networks from organizing. If anything, pushing rhetoric underground may make it more difficult to monitor or track those planning violence. The deeper problem is not speech itself but the underlying belief that violence against civilians is justified. The rhetoric follows from that belief rather than causing it.

Jacobsen: I remember being questioned at Ben Gurion Airport in Israel. I did not realize beforehand how seriously the country treats security threats. The questioning procedures and operational structure reflected an environment in which officials assume threats are constant. Travelers are expected to follow procedures precisely, and the process is extremely thorough.

I am not suggesting that countries such as Australia or Canada should adopt the same level of intensity. But some degree of heightened vigilance can be useful. Long periods of stability sometimes create a habit of assuming threats will not materialize domestically.

Tsukerman: I think there has been complacency and, at times, a lack of political realism. For example, when public figures praise or appear to legitimize groups like Hamas after events such as the killing of more than a thousand Israeli civilians and the abduction of hostages on October 7, 2023, the messaging can be interpreted in ways that were not intended. Even if the intention is not to support Hamas directly, the symbolism can be read that way by supporters and opponents alike.

This type of messaging reflects a broader misunderstanding. Some policymakers assume that extremist actors interpret signals through the same political and cultural frameworks common in Western democracies. They do not. That misunderstanding can be dangerous. It applies not only to antisemitism but to security policy more broadly and to how societies respond to ideological extremism.

Understanding the worldview and motivations of adversaries is essential. Without that understanding, policy responses risk missing the underlying dynamics that drive radicalization and violence.

Jacobsen: The uncomfortable reality is that not everyone in the world intends goodwill toward others all the time.

Tsukerman: Exactly. Not everyone shares the same assumptions about cooperation, tolerance, or peaceful coexistence.

Not everything can be resolved through rational political processes. Some disputes cannot be settled through normal diplomatic channels. When an organization’s charter openly calls for the elimination of an entire nation, that is a genocidal objective. There is no rational political compromise that can be drawn from such a position.

The same point applies when examining Iran’s ideological framework and constitutional principles. Iranian leadership has articulated ambitions for regional transformation for decades, not only regarding Israel but across the broader Middle East. Since the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979, Iran and the United States have remained in a state of hostility. The methods have varied over time, often constrained by pragmatic considerations, but the ideological posture has remained largely unchanged. Attempts by outside governments to negotiate with Tehran have sometimes underestimated the fact that each side is pursuing fundamentally different strategic games. From that perspective, Iran’s leadership has consistently maintained positions that Western policymakers hope might evolve but rarely do.

Jacobsen: Returning to the Canadian context and the gunfire at the U.S. consulate, I am reminded of a reflection by Richard Feynman on the possible future paths of science. Feynman suggested that there are several ways the story of scientific discovery might unfold. One possibility is that science continues indefinitely: we never reach final answers, but our understanding becomes progressively deeper and more refined as new questions emerge. Another possibility is that we eventually discover the fundamental laws of nature—the basic principles underlying physical reality—after which the remaining work becomes applying those laws to increasingly complex systems. A third possibility is that we encounter limits to understanding: either the laws of nature are too complicated for us to uncover completely, or our methods and conceptual frameworks are insufficient to capture the full structure of reality.

There may be a similar set of possibilities when analyzing social phenomena. In our Maple Monitor series, we have been documenting trends in antisemitic incidents. The most recent spike occurred in early March 2026. Looking at the recent gunfire attacks on synagogues, what paths forward do you see emerging from this pattern?

Tsukerman: From my perspective, some of these attacks function as a form of testing. Perpetrators may be measuring reaction times and the types of responses coming from authorities. They may also be signaling. Intelligence agencies are not the only actors capable of sending coded signals. Local extremist networks can also communicate through actions.

These acts can signal presence: “We are here.” They can serve as recruitment messaging, inviting sympathizers to join. They can challenge the broader community by effectively asking how society will respond. And they can signal escalation. Even if incidents are not formally coordinated, copycat actions still communicate support for a particular method of violence.

In that sense, patterns of attacks can function as a decentralized communication system among extremists. Individuals see what others are doing and replicate it, reinforcing the tactic.

The response from local authorities has often been limited to condemnatory statements. Statements are important, but the question is whether they will be followed by meaningful enforcement. One issue raised in these debates is whether governments will apply definitions such as the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism when evaluating rhetoric and activity that may contribute to these incidents. Critics argue that some organizations and political actors use rhetorical frameworks that function as justifications for antisemitic hostility while avoiding accountability.

Jacobsen: Years ago, Bill Maher interviewed Benjamin Netanyahu on Real Time. The discussion included a question about some American Christian groups that support Israel partly because of theological beliefs about the Second Coming. Netanyahu responded along the lines of: that issue can be addressed when it arises. In other words, immediate security concerns take priority over speculative theological future scenarios.

A similar attitude appears in certain Orthodox Jewish perspectives regarding the arrival of the Messiah. That question will be addressed when it becomes relevant. Until then, practical responsibilities remain. In the current context, law enforcement has a duty not only to issue statements after incidents but to follow through with investigations and enforcement. If a prime minister or provincial premier publicly addresses an attack, it is reasonable to expect substantive follow-up.

Another question concerns New York City politics. Has Mayor Mamdani formally renounced the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism, or is it primarily political signaling?

Tsukerman: As far as I know, withdrawing a jurisdiction from the IHRA definition would normally require legislative action. I do not believe there has been a formal withdrawal. However, there have been signals suggesting that the definition is not being treated as a priority in practice. For example, inviting individuals who deny Israel’s right to exist to official events sends a message, even if the IHRA definition remains technically recognized.

It is also worth noting that the IHRA definition is only one of several frameworks used to define antisemitism. Other definitions exist in academic and policy debates. Historically, many jurisdictions have operated without adopting any formal definition at all.

The most concerning actors, however, are not those debating definitions but those committing violent acts—people firing gunshots at synagogues or other targets. Harassment exists in many forms, and public figures often experience it regularly. Jewish women, for example, often face harassment that combines antisemitic and gendered abuse.

One issue worth highlighting is how certain forms of hostility have become normalized. Whether it is misogyny or antisemitism, bullying behaviors that were once widely condemned are sometimes reframed as expressions of independence, free speech, or provocative “edginess.” That shift can grant a form of social legitimacy to behavior that previously would have been recognized as harassment.

Some commentators justify this shift as a reaction against what they perceive as excessive political correctness. At best, that interpretation misunderstands the problem. At worst, it becomes a convenient excuse for promoting divisive agendas.

Jacobsen: I once interviewed two authors about tariff policies during the early part of Donald Trump’s second presidential term. One of them described Trump as likely to become the most consequential American president in contemporary history. The phrasing struck me as interesting because it was not framed as praise or criticism but as an observation about impact.

One area in which that influence may appear is political demeanor and public decorum. That connects to the issue you raised about bullying becoming normalized in public discourse. The tone set by political leaders can influence how conflict is expressed in society. The forms of harassment that emerge can also be gendered, with women often facing different types of abuse than men.

In fact, the issue became significant enough that I conducted a four-part interview series with a colleague, Khadija Khan, examining patterns of harassment and how they manifest across gender, politics, and public communication. She described the harassment women journalists receive online. From her account, the baseline harassment often resembles what male journalists receive—insults, threats, hostility—but with an additional layer. In many cases the language becomes sexualized or incorporates explicit imagery directed specifically at women.

Before leaving for one of my Ukraine trips, I received a ‘fan mail’ that read: “Your writing sucks, and I hope you die soon.” The timing struck me because I was preparing to travel into a war zone. In that context, I took it as a legitimate threat. The message was not sexualized, but it was clearly harassment and intimidation and, more directly, a threat. According to Khan’s reporting and experience, women frequently receive those same kinds of threats combined with sexualized abuse layered on top of them.

That relates to the normalization you mentioned earlier. I think a large part of the change in tone comes from shifts in political demeanor and decorum. In that respect, Donald Trump has been extraordinarily consequential, perhaps more than is widely acknowledged.

Tsukerman: I agree that his influence on public tone has been significant. His style gave many people permission to embrace behavior they might previously have restrained. For some individuals it was easier to follow that model, and others already wanted to act that way and simply felt validated.

There is also a broader dynamic at work. Over the past decade there has been a pattern of political discourse becoming increasingly polarized. Civility in political communication has eroded, and Americans often find themselves unable to speak to each other in humanizing ways. Some analysts argue that foreign actors have amplified that polarization through information campaigns, while domestic political figures across the spectrum have sometimes exploited it.

It is also fair to note that the trend did not begin with Trump. Earlier political rhetoric included extreme comparisons and accusations as well. However, Trump’s approach pushed the style into a more personal register, targeting individual opponents directly rather than simply attacking opposing political camps.

Jacobsen: That connects to the incidents we have been discussing. The recent gunfire directed at synagogues has not, to my knowledge, resulted in deaths or injuries. Nevertheless, the symbolism is powerful.

You once made a useful analogy. If someone spray-paints a Nazi symbol under a bridge or elsewhere, it remains a Nazi symbol. But if someone paints that symbol on a synagogue, the context transforms it into a direct antisemitic threat directed at a specific community.

Similarly, some of the recent incidents appear to blur the line between criticism of Israeli policy and hostility toward Jewish people more broadly. In the California assault we discussed earlier, the attackers explicitly linked Jewish identity with Israel’s actions. That conflation—treating Jews everywhere as responsible for the actions of a state, has historically been one of the classic mechanisms of antisemitic violence.

If the same individuals were responsible both for attacks on synagogues and the shooting near the U.S. consulate, it would suggest an even broader symbolic message: targeting Jewish institutions while also striking a diplomatic site associated with Israel’s principal ally. Whether or not such incidents are formally coordinated, the pattern itself communicates intent and ideology in ways that communities and investigators cannot ignore.

Tsukerman: If the targets are religious Jewish institutions rather than explicitly political ones, that is part of the message. Synagogues themselves are not political bodies, yet the attackers appear to treat them as political symbols. That suggests they believe Judaism and Israel are inseparable.

There is a historical dimension to that perception. Jewish tradition contains a longstanding connection to the land of Israel, and many religious practices historically relate to that land. Observant Jews often acknowledge that some commandments can only be fully practiced there. Because of that, attempts to separate Jewish religious identity entirely from the concept of Israel can be difficult to sustain in good faith.

Those carrying out these attacks are likely aware of that connection. While some commentators attempt to draw a strict distinction between Jewish identity and Israel, many people operating honestly within Jewish tradition acknowledge that the historical and religious links exist.

Jacobsen: I think that brings us to a natural stopping point for this discussion. I do not have anything further to add on that topic. Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a blogger on Vocal with over 130 posts on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978–1–0692343; 978–1–0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369–6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018–7399; Online: ISSN, 2163–3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719–6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The Good Men Project, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bankat In-Sight Publishing. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20–0708028), and others.