Iran is not Venezuela, despite Trump’s hopes of repeating ‘regime capture’ strategy

Some analysts say the U.S. administration under Donald Trump has hinted at using a strategy in Iran similar to its campaign in Venezuela, where officials recently ousted President Nicolás Maduro and installed a transitional leadership. But experts warningly note that Iran’s political structure, society and military are fundamentally different from Venezuela’s, and what worked — or appeared to work — in Caracas is unlikely to be replicated in Tehran.
Trump’s Venezuela Analogy
In early 2026, after U.S. forces and allied partners carried out operations in Venezuela that led to Maduro’s capture and removal from office, Trump publicly suggested that a similar outcome could be desirable in Iran. He framed the initial military actions against Iranian nuclear sites and leadership as an opening for Iranians to “take over their government,” implying that the United States might encourage a transition away from hardline rule.
This rhetoric drew immediate attention from analysts because it seemed to borrow from the so‑called “Venezuela model” — where the top leader is removed, while much of the existing government infrastructure is kept intact to avoid full occupation and governance burdens. That approach appeared in some U.S. media analyses of the Venezuela operation earlier this year.
Why the Comparison Falls Short
However, experts emphasize that the analogy does not hold in practice. Iran’s regime is rooted in a highly institutionalized, theocratic system that relies on multiple centers of power — not just a single leader. The Assembly of Experts, a clerical body trained deeply in Iran’s religious governance framework, would appoint a new supreme leader long before any outside power could influence internal succession — and its interests are tightly tied to the Islamic Republic’s survival.
An Iranian political analyst told Turkish Minute that unlike in Venezuela, “leadership removal alone cannot collapse the Iranian regime.” Iran’s political and military structures — particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — are deeply unified and resilient. Absent foreign troops on the ground or a clear internal push from powerful factions, regime collapse remains unlikely.
Regional and Structural Differences
The socio‑political landscapes of Venezuela and Iran also differ dramatically. Venezuela’s recent political crisis occurred in a small, economically struggling oil state with significant internal dissent and fractured elite cohesion. Iran, by contrast, is a populous nation of roughly 88 million with a strong ideological orientation, complex regional alliances, and a security apparatus that has remained intact despite U.S. and Israeli strikes.
Tehran’s nationalist sentiment, religious legitimacy and historical focus on self‑reliance make it far less amenable to externally mediated regime restructuring. Even after the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, analysts say regime continuity is plausible because Iran’s power structures emphasize ideological stability over individual leadership.
Trump’s Shifting Rhetoric on Regime Change
Trump himself has been inconsistent about the goal of regime change in Iran. In his campaign and early presidency, he criticised open‑ended foreign interventions and said that the U.S. should avoid trying to remake other governments. But his statements after U.S. strikes in Iran — including encouraging Iranians to seize control of their government — blurred the line between weakening Tehran’s military and pushing for political change.
While some U.S. officials frame the conflict as focused more narrowly on dismantling nuclear and missile capabilities, others openly discuss the possibility of new Iranian leadership that might be more conciliatory. Former CIA Director David Petraeus noted this scenario could emerge but said it would represent a dramatic departure from the current hardline leadership’s ideological commitments.
The Risks of Misapplied Strategy
Applying the Venezuela playbook to Iran risks misreading structural realities on the ground. Analysts warn that assuming comparable outcomes could lead to miscalculated expectations and deeper conflict, rather than successful political transition. The danger is that a strategy designed for one context — a small Latin American state with a fragile elite consensus — is being applied to a Middle Eastern theocracy with stronger internal cohesion and regional influence.
Critics also say that such misapplication could harden Iran’s resolve, making it more likely to resist external pressure and widen the conflict further, rather than capitulating to U.S. objectives.
Conclusion
While some leaders have floated the idea of using a “Venezuela‑like” approach in Iran, political analysts and regional experts emphasize that Iran’s theocratic structures, military unity and social dynamics make it very different from Venezuela. What may have appeared to work in one context cannot be assumed to work in another, and policymakers risk underestimating the complexity and resilience of Iran’s political system if they rely on such analogies.